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The Competition Bill 
in the House of Lords
by Tim Frazer
Tim Frazer outlines the background and gives details of the 
content of the bill currently awaiting royal assent, showing that, 
although English law will become much closer to EC law, 
significant differences will remain.
The Competition Bill has completed its second reading and committee stages in the House of Lords; and the likely nature of the new law is now emerging. There has 
been universal acclaim for the general themes underlying the 
new law and few regrets at the demise of the remote and 
impracticable provisions of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1976 
(RTPA). However some practical problems remain with the bill 
in its present form (or its likely form on report). This article, 
while acknowledging the triumphs, explores the remaining 
problems. Lord Eraser's description of the bill as 'half-baked 
and ill thought out' (Official Report, 30/10/97, col. 1149) seems 
rather unfair; but there are certainly issues which remain to be 
resolved.
The introduction ot the Competition Bill into the House of 
Lords represents the first legislative response to a process which 
commenced with the publication in 1988 of a green paper 
(Review of Restrictive Trade Practices Policy, Cm 331). Although a 
radical revision of competition policy was advertised in the 
subsequent white paper (Opening Markets: New Policy on Restrictive 
Trade Practices, Cm 727, 1989) no action was taken to bring the 
matter to Parliament until the publication in August 1996 of a 
draft bill by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), 
following a further round of consultation (see the DTI's 
consultation document no. 996, Tackling Cartels and the Abuse of 
Market Power) The Labour government continued the process 
with the publication in August 1997 of a further draft bill and 
consultative document (A prohibition approach to anti-competitive 
agreements and abuse of dominant position). The bill was published 
on IS October 1997 and completed its second reading and 
committee stages in the House of Lords before the end of 
November 1997. It is expected to receive royal assent in May or 
June 1998.
EUROPEAN ALIGNMENT
The principal feature of the bill is the repeal ol the RTPA and 
the introduction of effects-based prohibitions of anti- 
competitive agreements and abuse ol dominance. The 
provenance of such prohibitions is the Treaty ol Rome; the UK
is one of the last member states to conform its domestic 
competition legislation with EC law. In that respect it is also 
preceded by the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, many 
of whom have aligned their laws with art. 85 and 86 of the treaty 
in preparation for a closer association with the European Union.
The new law is more impressively underpinned by powers of 
enforcement and investigation than is currently the case. Fines 
ol up to 10% of UK turnover can be imposed for breach of the 
prohibitions, interim orders can be used to preserve the status 
quo, third parties are given enhanced rights of intervention, and 
the Office of Fair Trading will have the power to undertake 
searches ol premises used for business. This has been achieved 
by a bill which, while not a model of simplicity, does not rebuild 
a Byzantine edifice from the rubble of the RTPA.
HARMONISATION
'We are borrowing, not applying, EC law'. (Lord Simon, Official 
Report, 25/11/90, col. 962).
As one of the purposes of the legislative changes is to bring 
UK domestic competition law more into line with EC law, the 
major provisions of the bill are modelled on art. 85 and 86. This 
policy on compatibility between the two legal regimes was 
exhibited in the 1988 green paper (see para. 3.15 - 3.17) and 
was maintained in the white paper (see para. 2.6) and in the two 
consultative documents which preceded the introduction of the 
bill into the House of Lords. The practical advantages to 
business of avoiding inconsistency and conflict between the two 
legal regimes have been emphasised by the DTI. On behalf of 
the government, Lord Haskel stated:
7 cannot over-emphasise that the purpose of the Bill is to ensure as 
Jar as possible a consistency with EC approach [sic] and thereby to ease 
burdensJor business.' (OJficial Report, 17/1 1/97, col. 417).
The mechanisms put in place to achieve such harmony are 
twofold: the use of the wording ol art. 85 and 86 in the 
corresponding provisions ol the bill; and the requirement ol cl. 58
that the bill be interpreted and applied in a manner which is 
consistent with the treatment of corresponding provisions of EC 
law.
The first of these strategies has given rise to two look-alike 
prohibitions based on art. 85 and 86. Clause 2 of the bill 
prohibits anti-competitive agreements and cl. 18 prohibits the 
abuse of a dominant position. Clause 2 (the Chapter I 
prohibition) mimics art. 85 almost word for word, with the 
substitution of 'within the UK' for 'between member states' and 
'within the common market'. This transliteration of the article, 
rather than its adaptation, presents some problems of 
interpretation. Clause 2 prohibits:
'agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of 
undertakings or concerted practices which (a) may affect trade within 
the UK; and (b) have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction 
or distortion of competition within the UK'.
The prohibition is to apply only if the transaction is, or is 
intended to be, implemented in the UK. Thus, in order for the 
Chapter I prohibition to apply, three conditions as to location 
must be satisfied:
(1) the transaction must be capable of affecting trade within the 
UK,
(2) the object or effect of the transaction must be anti- 
competitive within the UK, and
(3) the transaction must be, or must be intended to be, 
implemented in the UK.
In practice, these conditions will differ very little, if at all, 
from each other.
SEMANTIC CONVERGENCE
The requirement to show that trade in the UK may be 
affected (in addition to demonstrating an anti-competitive 
object or effect within the UK) is more an example of semantic 
convergence than of real legislative harmonisation, since the 
corresponding words used in art. 85 perform a very particular 
purpose not relevant to a national legal regime. Thus art. 85 is 
only capable of applying to a transaction where it 'may affect 
trade between Member States'. This is a means of distinguishing 
those transactions which are regulated at a Community level 
from those regulated at a national level only. As the EC 
Commission has recently said, in order to be regulated by art. 
85:
'an agreement must be likely to have an effect on the freedom of 
trade between Member States whether directly or indirectly, actually or 
potentially, in a way which could damage the realisation of the 
objectives of the single market, in particular by partitioning national 
markets or by the modification of competitive structures within the 
Community.' (Notice of the Commission relating to the revision of the 
notice on agreements of minor importance (OJ 1997 C29/3)).
Since the jurisdictional elements of the UK legislation are 
dealt with in the requirement that the anti-competitive effect 
must be felt in the UK, there seems to be little logical 
requirement for an additional requirement that trade in the UK 
be affected by the transaction. Other member states who have 
adopted legislation on similar lines to art. 85 have not followed 
the dual approach adopted by the bill. (For a translation of 
extracts of the relevant national legislation, see J Maitland- 
Walker, Competition Laws of Europe, Butterworths, London, 
1995.)
Lord Simon accepted that EC competition law:
'has certain elements which cannot simply be transposed into the 
domestic system'.
since they do not make sense in a purely domestic context. This 
is put forward as an explanation of the substitution of 
'competition within the United Kingdom' in place of 
'competition within the common market'. It does not, however, 
justify the inclusion of the requirement to demonstrate that, 
additionally, trade within the UK may be affected by the 
transaction.
COURTS' APPROACH
The second strategy for convergence is contained in cl. 58 
which requires questions arising under the new legislation to be 
dealt with in a manner which is consistent with the treatment of 
corresponding questions arising in Community law. Any court 
or tribunal determining a question arising under the new law 
must act with a view to securing that there is no inconsistency 
between the principles applied, and decisions reached by such a 
court, and the principles laid down by the Treaty and the 
European Court of Justice (and any relevant decision of the 
European Court of Justice). The court is also required to 'have 
regard' to any relevant decision or statement of the 
Commission. The Director General of Fair Trading ( DGFT) 
will also be subject to these requirements.
This provision is a device used to achieve a dynamic harmony 
with EC jurisprudence as it develops, as well as to simplify the 
presentation of the statutory provisions. Reliance on European 
Community jurisprudence and practice will enable the 
Competition Act to be adopted without specific provisions relating 
to the definition of key terms or as to the practice to be adopted 
in relation to key principles. Similarly, the guidelines and rules 
to be produced by the DGFT will be subject to the need to 
provide for harmony with corresponding EU practice and 
principles.
SOME DISTINCTIONS
Although, as noted above, the wording of cl. 2 demonstrates
o ' ' o
an unduly slavish reproduction of art. 85, there are some 
distinct differences between the bill and the corresponding 
provisions of EC law. There will, for example, be a broader grant 
of professional privilege under the bill than is available in 
relation to art. 85 proceedings under AM &^S Europe Ltd v EC 
Commission (Case 155/79) [1982] ECR 1575, so that relevant 
communications of employed solicitors will benefit from the 
privilege.
Further, the provisions relating to immunity from fines will 
differ. As noted below, minor agreements and conduct of minor 
significance will not usually attract fines. However there will be 
no guaranteed immunity for agreements notified to the DGFT 
for guidance or for exemption. Although cl. 13(4) and 14(4) 
may appear to grant such immunity along the lines permitted in 
art. 15(5) of Regulation 17/62 (OJ 1959-62, 87) the effect of 
sched. 5 para. 3 (2) (a) is considerably more draconian than is 
art. 15(6) of the regulation. The latter provision, it will be 
recalled, provides for immunity from fines to be prospectively 
removed where the EC Commission forms a preliminary view 
that the agreement is unlikely to benefit from the exemption 
provisions of art. 85(3). In sched. 5, however, the bill 
retrospectively removes the immunity wherever the DGFT
makes a provisional decision that it would not be appropriate to 
grant an individual exemption to a notified agreement.
One further point of departure worth noting is that the 
monopoly provisions of the Fair Trading Act 1973 are to be 
retained alongside the art. 864-type provision contained in 
cl. 18 (the Chapter II prohibition). Thus, the complex 
monopoly provisions of the 1973 Act are to be used to fill the 
gap between the Chapter I and Chapter II prohibitions. The 
scale monopoly provisions will be used (if it all) only where the 
structural remedies available there will be more effective in 
relation to serial abusers.
VERTICAL AGREEMENTS
In the 1989 white paper, the government concluded that 
vertical agreements should be included in the prohibition, but it 
signalled a change of policy when it consulted in 1996. In the 
consultation document published with the first draft of the bill 
it indicated that the debate on the regulation on vertical 
agreements under EC law had caused it to review its earlier 
decision not to exclude vertical agreements from the 
prohibition. The DTI stated the government's new view when it 
consulted on the 1997 draft of the bill   viz, that the exclusion 
of vertical agreements would:
(1) reduce the burden on industry and on the regulatory 
authorities;
(2) target attention on cases of market power or network 
agreements; and
(3) reduce the restrictive effect imposed by block exemptions.
Having reviewed the difficulty of defining a vertical 
agreement, the 1997 draft bill did not include any provisions 
relating to them. Although the government remain convinced of
o o o
the need to exclude vertical non-price agreements from the 
Chapter I prohibition (even if a different approach is adopted 
under art. 85) it. was somewhat hampered by the fact that the 
EC Commission's own study of the regulation of vertical 
agreements was not concluded at the time the bill was
o
published. The bill was therefore introduced in the House of 
Lords without any reference to vertical agreements and no such 
references were added during the second reading ando o
committee stages.
THE DE MINIMIS DOCTRINE
In keeping with the principle of compatibility with art. 85, the 
Chapter I prohibition is intended to apply only to those 
transactions which have an appreciable effect on competition. 
An explicit appreciability test was not included in the bill for 
fear that this might cause a semantic divergence between the 
Chapter I prohibition and art. 85. The practice of the EC 
Commission in determining the question of appreciability is 
contained in its Notice on agreements of minor importance. The bill 
does, however, depart from practice under art. 85 and 86 by the 
introduction of two new categories, 'small agreements' and 
'conduct of minor significance'. Both of these are to be defined 
by reference to turnover and market share, the turnover 
threshold being somewhere between £20m £50m.
The bill provides that parties to small agreements, and 
persons carrying on conduct of minor significance, will enjoy an 
immunity from fines; the immunity may be prospectively 
withdrawn by the DGFT. In all other respects, the prohibitions 
will apply to such agreements or conduct. The limited nature of
the immunity for small agreements conflicts with the underlying 
assumption about the interpretation of cl. 2, noted above. Small 
agreements are excluded from art. 85 on the virtually 
irrebuttable presumption that they cannot affect competition to 
a significant degree. Such agreements can therefore be taken to 
be valid, stable and beyond likely challenge by parties, third 
parties or enforcers. Such an immunity is not available under the 
bill, since small agreements will be prohibited, and the relevant 
clauses will be void ab initio and unavailable in legal 
proceedings. The only immunity offered is one against fines. 
Full immunity will only be available to agreements which are 
both small and which do not have an appreciable effect on 
competition. If there is a difference in these concepts, it will 
make it difficult to give advice in relation to modest agreements; 
if there is no such difference, the introduction of the new 
categories seems unnecessary and prolix.
SIGNIFICANT DEPARTURE
The whole purpose of the EU approach   under the 
Commission's Notice — is to enable parties to a (defined) minor 
agreement to relax about competition regulation, knowing that 
the agreement would be extremely difficult to challenge. If the 
UK method is to be a dual approach (a definition of small 
agreement, and a definition of appreciable effect), then this will 
be a significant departure from the EC approach   a departure 
surely not intended by cl. 58. The government has also indicated 
that there will be an exemption for agreements which, at the 
date of enactment, benefit from directions under s. 21 (2) of the 
RTPA (wrhich discharges the DGFT from taking proceedings in 
respect of agreements which are not of such significance as to 
call for investigation). The DGFT will be able to nullify any such 
exemption on an individual basis, but the proposed approach 
will further confuse the position relating to small or insignificant 
agreements, and will preserve a distinction between the UK 
legislation and art. 85.
THE RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES
One of the key differences between the current and proposed 
regimes was to be the place of third party rights in ensuring the 
full deterrent effect of the prohibitions. Third party actions, 
although available under RTPA, s. 35 have not had any 
significant role to play in supporting the enforcement of the 
current regime or in protecting the rights of persons injured by 
the operation of an unlawful restriction. The rights available 
under the proposed legislation are to be assisted in three ways:
(1) by enabling a decision of the DGFT to be admitted as 
evidence in a third party action;
(2) by enabling the DGFT to disclose material to third parties 
about a breach; and
(3) by enabling third parties with sufficient interest to appeal 
against decisions of the DGFT.
The first such feature extends the corresponding provisions of 
RTPA s. 35(7) (which concerns only findings of law and fact 
made by the Restrictive Practices Court); the second is available 
under RTPA s. 41; the third is a novel feature   presently actions 
can be commenced under the RTPA only by parties to an 
agreement or by 'persons aggrieved' by the registration or non- 
registration of an agreement. However what is missing from the 
bill is any convenient means by which a third party may bring a 
civil action for breach of either of the prohibitions.
It will be recalled that RTPA s. 35(2) provides that the obligation
to comply with the registration requirements of that statute is a 
duty, breach of which:
'is actionable accordingly subject to the defences and other incidents 
applying to actions for breach of statutory duty'.
No such statement appears in the bill. Lord Lucas reported to 
the House that he had searched for such a provision in case it 
was to be found 'somewhere in its crannies and crevices' (Official 
Report, 17/11/97, col. 454). The government responded that 
there is 'no need to make explicit provision in the bill' to achieve 
an effective right of private actions (col. 956), and that third 
party actions under the law will be the same as those under art. 
85 and 86. In that there is a paucity of authority on the nature 
of third party actions under those articles, and some continuing 
uncertainties in relation to the nature of available remedies (see 
Hall et al, 'UK' in The Application of Articles 85 and 86 of the EC 
Treaty by National Courts in the Member States, EC Commission 
1997), it is somewhat surprising, and rather unsatisfactory, that 
a key feature of the bill is left to implication and conjecture.
CONCLUSION
Lord Lucas in the second reading of the bill suggested that:
o oo
'many businessmen fancy 'a bit of corporate nookie' — cuddling up 
to a competitor or abuse of a dominant position. After all, that is only 
human nature. It is reasonable for the government to want to control 
those urges in the interests of us all and in the end the health of the 
business community'.
The bill certainly forms the basis of a reliable control 
mechanism; with some fine-tuning, it should be capable of 
providing an effective and long-term legislative regime. @
Tim Frazer
Associate, Dibb Lupton Alsop
Visiting Professor, Newcastle Law School
The themes of this paper will be dealt with at greater length in Tim 
Frazer and Stephen Hornsby, The Competition Act 1998, Jordans, 1998.
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